A Large Trader in Bubbles and Crashes: an Application to Currency Attacks by Mei Li & Frank Milne
A Large Trader in Bubbles and Crashes: An
Application to Currency Attacks
Mei Li Frank Milne∗
January 29, 2010
Abstract
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) study stock market bubbles and crashes in a dy-
namic model with a continuum of rational small traders. We introduce a large trader
into their model and apply it to currency attacks. In an attack against a ﬁxed exchange
rate regime with a gradually overvaluing currency, traders lack common knowledge
about the time when the overvaluation starts. Meanwhile, they need to coordinate
to break a peg. In such a setup, both the inability of traders to synchronize their
attack and their incentive to time the collapse of the regime lead to the persistent
overvaluation of the currency. We ﬁnd that the presence of a large trader with perfect
information will accelerate the collapse of the regime and alleviate currency overvalu-
ation. However, if a large trader has incomplete information, the presence of a large
trader may accelerate or delay the collapse of the regime ex post, depending on the
size of his wealth and the precision of his information. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that a
large trader with both a large amount of wealth and very noisy information can greatly
delay the collapse of the regime ex post. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the presence of a large
trader with incomplete information can greatly increase the unpredictability about the
time when the regime collapses, implying the diﬃculty for traders to time the collapse.
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11 Introduction
Asset bubbles where asset prices deviate from fundamental values, and their subse-
quent crashes, can inﬂict great damage on an economy through various channels of
resource misallocation. A large body of economic literature has discussed this issue,
especially since the current ﬁnancial crisis. One strand of the literature explains why
asset bubbles and crashes can exist even in the presence of wealth constrained ra-
tional arbitrageurs. This argument challenges the Eﬃcient Market Hypothesis by
assuming that there is a mass of behavioral traders who are unaware of the bubble,
but potential rational arbitragers become only aware of the bubble sequentially until
they, and their combined wealth, can have suﬃcient impact to burst the bubble. The
paper developed by Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) is one of the seminal theoreti-
cal papers in this literature. In their model, rational arbitrageurs in a market (they
analyze stock markets as an example) become aware of an asset bubble sequentially.
Due to the lack of common knowledge about the bubble, and need for coordination
to burst the bubble, the bubble will be persistent and its bursting time depends on
the incentives of the arbitrageurs to “ ride the bubble,” as opposed to incentives to
preempt other arbitrageurs in selling the asset.
In Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), rational arbitrageurs are negligibly small and
identical ex ante. This model does not address the empirically important case where
there is a large arbitrageur and the mass of small arbitrageurs who must time their
bursting of the bubble. Large traders (e.g., hedge funds and banks) are an important
group of market participants in asset markets. For example, large traders such as
George Soros have been alleged to have played an active role in currency attacks
against ﬁxed exchange rate regimes in foreign exchange markets. They include the
2attack against British pound in 1992, and the attacks against East Asian currencies in
1997 and 1998. Large traders launch currency attacks by employing short positions.
They try to inﬂuence market sentiment by publicly announcing their short positions
and beliefs that devaluation is inevitable. This causes herding among small traders,
and/or deters contrarians from taking opposite positions. It seems that the presence of
large traders facilitates coordination among traders and increases ﬁnancial instability
in the attacked currencies, specially in small economy currencies. This is sometimes
called the “big elephants in small ponds” eﬀect.
To analyze this type of market, we develop a model to study the role of a large
trader in a currency attack. The model is based on the analysis in Abreu and Brun-
nermeier (2003). Similar to their model, we assume that a currency begins to be over-
valued in a ﬁxed exchange rate regime after a certain time. Traders have dispersed
opinions in the sense that they only become aware of the overvaluation sequentially.
In addition, we assume that the ﬁxed exchange rate regime will collapse only when
attacking pressure reaches a threshold level. This assumption captures the main fea-
ture of currency attacks: there is a necessity for coordination among traders to break
a currency peg. This coordination feature is emphasized in Obstfeld (1996) and other
currency attack models (see especially Morris and Shin (1998)). In our setup, traders
try to choose the optimal time to launch their attack, driven by two competing in-
centives: ﬁrst, the incentive to “ride the overvaluation;” and second, the incentive to
preempt other traders. The traders’ incentive to “ride the overvaluation” stems from
two sources in our model: ﬁrst, they can reap higher beneﬁts from the devaluation if
the overvaluation lasts longer. Second, if they time their attack more precisely, they
will save on attacking costs. The trader attempts to preempt other traders, because
3only the trader attacking early will gain from the collapse of the regime. The late
traders will gain nothing.
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) consider a symmetric game with a continuum of
atomistic small arbitrageurs. We are more interested in a richer market structure
where both a large trader and a continuum of small traders are present. More speciﬁ-
cally, we are interested in studying how the introduction of a large trader will change
equilibrium outcomes. In our model, a large trader is deﬁned by two characteristics:
ﬁrst, they have more precise information about the fundamental value of a currency.
Second, a large trader can employ substantially larger amounts of wealth to launch
a currency attack. The wealth that a large trader employs can come from their own
capital, or more importantly, from their accessibility to credit due to their reputation.
This is exactly how highly leveraged ﬁnancial institutions ﬁnance their speculation.
Using our model, we ﬁnd some interesting, and sometimes counter-intuitive, re-
sults. In the case in which the large trader has perfect information about the overval-
uation of a currency, we ﬁnd: ﬁrst, his presence will accelerate the collapse of a ﬁxed
rate regime. Second, the collapse of the ﬁxed rate regime is accelerated due to two
reasons: (1) a large trader brings in additional speculative capital to an attack. (2)
the presence of a large trader induces more aggressive strategies on the part of small
traders. Third, the presence of a large trader will accelerate the collapse of a regime,
even assuming that a large trader will not bring additional speculative capital to an
attack, but will only change the distribution of the total speculative capital. (That
is, with a large trader, the total speculative capital is more concentrated, instead of
being evenly distributed over all traders.) Fourth, the larger the wealth of a large
trader, the sooner the ﬁxed exchange rate regime collapses. Fifth, we ﬁnd that the
4presence of a large trader does not necessarily reduce the “bubble”, which is deﬁned
as the duration between the time when the traders aware of the overvaluation have
enough attacking capital to burst the bubble, and the time when the currency peg is
actually broken.
In the case where the large trader has incomplete information, we ﬁnd that: First,
the presence of a large trader greatly increases the unpredictability of the time when
the regime collapses, especially when the large trader has very imprecise information.
This increases the diﬃculty for traders to time the collapse of the regime. We ﬁnd
this result especially interesting. In the model with a continuum of small traders,
the time when the regime collapses is certain, given the time when the overvaluation
starts is known. However, with the introduction of a large trader with incomplete
information, we ﬁnd that the time when the regime collapses now depends crucially
on when the large trader becomes aware of the overvaluation, which could be any time
within the large trader’s awareness time window. Now even with perfect information
about the time when the overvaluation starts, we can only predict the distribution
about the time when the regime collapses. This greatly increases the uncertainty for
traders to time the collapse of the regime. Our model demonstrates that the feature
of perfect predictability of a crash, given the time when the overvaluation starts is
known, is quite fragile. It depends critically on the assumption that all traders are
negligibly small and identical. Thus, our model reveals that “timing a crash” and
making proﬁts from “riding a bubble” is diﬃcult because of randomness.
Second, we ﬁnd that the presence of the large trader may delay the collapse of
the regime ex post, especially when the large trader has noisy information (but more
precise information than small traders) and a large amount of wealth. We ﬁnd that
5this result is interesting since it is diﬀerent from the usual perception that the presence
of a large trader will facilitate arbitrage and reduce asset mispricing. The intuition
behind our result is as follows. There are two incentives driving a large trader to
decide when to attack: the incentive to preempt other traders, and the incentive to
“ride the overvaluation”. When the large trader has incomplete information about the
time when the overvaluation starts, his decision on when to attack crucially depends
on when he becomes aware of the overvaluation. Conditional on becoming aware
of the overvaluation late in his time window, his belief about the collapse of the
regime will be delayed, and his incentive to “ride the overvaluation” will induce him
to attack later. In this case, the collapse of the regime may be delayed ex post in
the presence of the large trader. This delay can be severe when the large trader has
a large amount of wealth, since the collapse of the regime now depends more on the
large trader’s action. This result is diﬀerent from the case when the large trader has
perfect information. In that case, we ﬁnd that the large trader’s incentive to preempt
other traders dominates his incentive to “ride the overvaluation”: the presence of the
large trader always accelerates the collapse of the regime.
In sum, we ﬁnd that the role of a large trader in a currency attack depends crucially
on the quality of his information. A large trader with high quality information and
a large amount of wealth can correct the overvaluation eﬃciently and accelerate the
collapse of the regime. On the other hand, a large trader with low quality information
and a large amount of wealth can severely strengthen the overvaluation and delay the
collapse of the regime.
All of our results can be generalized to any asset markets. For example, the
model can be easily interpreted as a study on foreign exchange markets without
6central bank intervention. Instead, we could assume that the bubble occurs because
noise traders in the foreign exchange market believe that the current exchange rate
level can be maintained and will trade at this level. In this way, our model can be
used to explain the “currency bubbles and crashes” in foreign exchange markets with
a ﬂoating exchange rate regime as mentioned in Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen
(2009). We can further generalize our results to any asset market with behavioral
traders. In our model, we assume that the market price of a currency is unchanged,
but its fundamental value is falling. More generally asset bubbles are often assumed
to reﬂect rising asset prices, while its fundamental value stops growing. There is no
essential diﬀerence in these two situations since what a arbitrageur cares about is the
diﬀerence between the market price and its fundamental value, and not the direction
of asset price changes. Thus, our results can be applied to any asset bubble and
subsequent crash.
Our paper contributes to two strands of literature. The ﬁrst strand of literature is
on asset bubbles and crashes. The second strand of literature is on currency attacks.
Our contribution to the ﬁrst strand of literature is to introduce a large trader to Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2003), and examine how the presence of a large trader will aﬀect
the evolvement of asset bubbles and subsequent crashes, in an environment where
all traders are rational but become sequentially aware of a bubble. Our model also
complements the currency attack literature. There are two strands of the currency
attack literature closely related to our paper: One strand consists of currency attack
models introducing incomplete information into the ﬁrst generation currency attack
models to explain the large devaluation observed after a ﬁxed exchange rate regime
collapses. The other strand consists of the currency attack models examining the role
7of a large trader in a currency attack. A detailed literature survey will be given in
Section 2.
The rest of the paper consists of six sections. Section 2 provides a literature survey.
Section 3 discusses the basic model and characterization of a dynamic currency attack.
The model is a simpliﬁed version of the Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) model:
the model has a continuum of small arbitrageurs trading in a currency with a ﬁxed
exchange rate, that is open to a currency attack. We provide a characterization of
the equilibrium and comparative statics. Section 4 introduces a large trader with
perfect information, proves that there is a unique equilibrium, characterizes that
equilibrium, and conducts comparative statics for the model. Section 5 introduces a
large trader with incomplete information and examines its role. Section 6 concludes
with observations on further possible extensions.
2 Literature Survey
Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) construct a dynamic coordination game to explain
the existence of asset bubbles, even in the presence of rational arbitrageurs who are
capable of bursting the bubble. We have discussed their model above. Brunnermeier
and Morgan (2008) change the assumption of a continuum of small traders in Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2003), assuming a ﬁnite number of small traders. Nonetheless,
their focus is still on symmetric equilibria. Since we focus on the study of the role that
a large trader plays in a currency attack, our model exhibits a richer market structure
where both a large trader and a continuum of atomistic traders co-exist. Moreover,
equilibrium strategies between a large trader and small traders are asymmetric in
8our model. Our another modiﬁcation to their model is that we use the uniform
distribution, rather than the exponential distribution to characterize traders’ belief.
This assumption simpliﬁes our analysis.
Following Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), a large body of literature studies asset
bubbles and crashes in a setup where traders have an incentive to “ride the bubble”.
Among them, Matsushima (2008) studies asset bubbles and crashes in a modiﬁed
timing game. Instead of assuming sequential awareness of traders, he assumes that
some traders are behavioral and always “ride the bubble”. He demonstrates that even
with a small probability that an arbitrageur is behavioral, rational arbitrageurs are
willing to “ride the bubble”, given that the information about whether an arbitrageur
is rational or not is incomplete. Our model diﬀers from his, because our focus is on
how a rational large trader, will aﬀect the evolvement of asset bubbles and crashes
in a model where all traders are rational.
Both Rochon (2006) and Gara Minguez-Afonso (2007) apply Abreu and Brunner-
meier (2003) to the ﬁrst generation currency attack models to explain the devaluation
that we observe when a ﬁxed exchange rate regime collapses. The most important
diﬀerence between our model and theirs is that our model focuses on the role of large
traders in a currency attack with imperfect common knowledge, while they study
currency attacks in a model without large traders. In addition, even in our basic
model without large traders, the way in which we model a currency attack is also
slightly diﬀerent from theirs. We model the payoﬀ structure of traders who try to
gain from the devaluation, while they model the payoﬀ structure of the attackers who
try to avoid a capital loss associated with devaluation. They assume, as in Abreu
and Brunnermeier (2003), exponential beliefs for traders.
9Broner (2008) studies currency attacks in a ﬁrst generation model of currency
crises by introducing incomplete information about the threshold level of attacking
pressure, or the foreign exchange reserves of a central bank. He assumes that some
consumers have perfect information about the threshold level, while some do not.
This assumption generates a sudden, discrete devaluation of a currency when the
ﬁxed exchange rate regime collapses. It is especially interesting to compare this
paper to ours because the perfectly informed consumers are similar to a large trader
with perfect information in our model. Our paper diﬀers from his in the following
ways: First, we introduce incomplete information by assuming sequential awareness
of traders, following Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003). Second, we study currency
attacks given a more general framework which can be applied to any asset market.
Therefore, our results can be generalized to any asset markets. His model is set up in
a more speciﬁc currency attack situation with certain assumptions about monetary
policies. Third, we study a more general case when a large trader has both perfect
information and incomplete information. His model focuses on the case when some
traders have perfect information. We attain diﬀerent results in the case when a large
trader has perfect information. Broner (2008) ﬁnds that when the proportion of
perfectly informed consumers is large enough, discrete devaluation will not happen.
While in our model with a single large trader with perfect information, even if total
speculative capital is large enough, the regime will not collapse immediately when
the overvaluation starts. The major reason that we have a diﬀerent result is that
Broner (2008) studies symmetric strategies by a continuum of consumers with perfect
information. While in our model we are studying a single large trader acting more
like a monopolist. The market power of a single large trader gives him a greater
10incentive to “ride the overvaluation”, and induces him to delay the attack, even when
he has perfect information. We reach the same conclusion that the presence of a
large trader with perfect information will accelerate the collapse of the regime. In our
more general case where a large trader has more precise (but not perfect) information
than small traders, we ﬁnd that the presence of a large trader can actually delay the
collapse of the regime, especially when a large trader has noisy information and a
large amount of speculative capital.
Morris and Shin (1998) study currency attacks in a one-period global game setup.
They demonstrate that, although a self-fulﬁlling currency attack game has multi-
ple equilibria when economic fundamentals are common knowledge, it has a unique
equilibrium when traders can only observe the fundamentals with small noise. Suc-
cessfully overcoming the problem of indeterminacy of multiple equilibria models, their
model allows the analysis of policy implications. Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin
(2004) extend the Morris and Shin (1998) model to one with a large trader. They
analyze two cases where the large trader has, and has not, a signalling function. They
ﬁnd that in both cases the presence of a large trader does increase the possibility of
the collapse of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime, and make small traders more aggressive.
Correstti, Pesenti, and Roubini (2001) give a comprehensive survey on the role
that large traders play in currency attacks. In the theoretical section of their survey,
they apply a traditional coordination game with perfect information, and then a global
game established by Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin (2004) to the study of the
role of a large trader in a currency market. In the empirical section, they combine both
econometric analysis and case studies to explore examples of currency attacks. Their
conclusion is that both theoretical and empirical studies reveal that large traders do
11have a signiﬁcant role in currency attacks, and more academic research is required to
address a number of issues, including the dynamics of currency attacks or crises.
Bannier (2005) modiﬁes the model established by Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and
Shin (2004) by changing the assumption about a central bank’s strategy. Due to
that modiﬁcation, both the large trader and small traders’ strategies are symmetric
and analytical results are available. She ﬁnds that this modiﬁcation changes the
results given by Corsetti, Dasgupta, Morris and Shin (2004). Now a large trader can
increase the possibility of a regime collapse only when market sentiment is pessimistic.
However, the presence of a large trader will decrease the possibility of a regime collapse
when the market sentiment is optimistic.
Due to the features of our model, our study of a large trader in currency attacks
focuses on a diﬀerent aspect compared to these two papers. They study the possi-
bility of the collapse of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime in a static model, and whether
the presence of large traders will increase or decrease that possibility. In our model,
currency devaluation is inevitable, and the issue that we focus on is when it will hap-
pen. Thus our study focuses on whether the presence of a large trader will accelerate
or delay a currency attack. Here we do not give a formal welfare analysis to examine
whether the presence of a large trader is beneﬁcial or harmful to an economy. How-
ever, in general, we believe that a currency overvaluation is harmful to an economy,
and early correction is always better than a late one if the correction is inevitable.
In this sense, a late collapse of the regime will do more harm to an economy than an
early one.
123 The Benchmark Model with Small Traders and
No Large Trader
3.1 Environment
In this model, we apply a simpliﬁed version of the Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003)
model to the foreign exchange market. We capture the essence of their idea that the
diﬃculty in coordination among arbitrageurs, together with their incentive to time the
market, can cause asset mispricing. Instead of adopting the exponential distribution
in their setup, we use the uniform distribution to simplify the calculation.
Assume that there is a country with a ﬁxed exchange rate regime where a central
bank commits to maintaining the exchange rate at a ﬁxed level until it exhausts all
of its foreign reserves, whose level is denoted by k > 0.
From time t0, the exchange rate becomes overvalued relative to its fundamental
value, at a rate of g. Denote the initial exchange rate as E0. The fundamental
exchange rate at t is E0 when t < t0 and E0(1 + g(t − t0)) when t ≥ t0. Here the
exchange rate is denominated in the domestic currency, say wons. So E0 means that
1 dollar can exchange for E0 wons.
Without any currency attacks, the ﬁxed exchange rate regime will collapse at some
exogenously given time t0+τ′. This assumption captures the idea that any asset mis-
pricing is not sustainable in the long run. We follow Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003)
in making this simpliﬁed assumption to avoid ever greater currency overvaluations.
Figure 1 shows how the fundamental exchange rate changes with time.
There is a continuum of traders of mass 1. Each trader is ﬁnancially constrained
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Figure 1: How the fundamental exchange rate E changes with time t
and can only access the credit whose worth is normalized to 1 dollar. Each trader has
to choose from two strategies: attacking or refraining. When t < t0+τ′, the exchange
rate will devalue to the fundamental value if and only if attacking pressure exceeds
k. This assumption follows that of Obstfeld (1996) and Morris and Shin (1998) and
captures the idea of market liquidity.
We specify the payoﬀ structure of traders as follows: if they choose refraining,
which means that they will do nothing, they will gain zero. If they choose to attack,
they will borrow wons from the banks of the attacked country, then exchange them
into dollars from the central bank. The costs of attacking consist of two parts. One
part is the ﬁxed transaction costs associated with the currency exchanges, which is
denoted by cF. We assume that the ﬁxed transaction costs are not so high that they
prevent the traders from ever attacking, despite the awareness of the overvaluation.
The other part is the interest diﬀerential between wons and dollars, since we assume
14that the interest rate of wons is higher than that of dollars. Let c denote the interest
diﬀerential. Thus, if a trader keeps attacking during a time interval △t, he will incur
the cost of c.△t. The payoﬀs of traders from attacking is as follows. If the regime
collapses at instant t, the payoﬀs of a trader attacking at instant t with the wealth
of 1 dollar will depend on how many other traders are attacking. If the attacking
mass is less than or equal to k, his payoﬀs are E0.g(t − t0). If the attacking mass is
greater than k, only the ﬁrst randomly chosen mass k of attacking traders will gain
the payoﬀs of E0.g(t−t0). So given the attacking pressure α > k, the expected payoﬀs
of a trader are given by k
αE0.g(t−t0). For simplicity of the analysis, we assume that
no partial attacking is allowed.
The traders only have incomplete information about t0, the time at which the
overvaluation begins. More speciﬁcally, all the traders have a prior belief about t0,
which is denoted by Φ(t0). We assume that the traders have an improper uniform
belief about t0 over [0,∞).
From t0, a new cohort of small traders with mass
1
η becomes aware of the overval-
uation in each instant from t0 until t0+η. So η is the time window for all the traders
to become aware of the overvaluation.
Suppose that a trader becomes aware of the overvaluation at time ti. We also
denote this trader by ti. Conditional on ti, trader ti’s belief about t0 is given by the
CDF
Φ(t0|ti) =
t − ti + η
η
, (1)
where t ∈ [ti − η,ti].
Given such a setup, we try to ﬁnd the equilibrium strategy of a rational trader ti.
15Let σ(t,ti) denote the strategy of trader ti and the function σ : [0,∞)×[0,∞)  →
{0,1} a strategy proﬁle. We assume that traders will act only after being informed.
Thus, trader ti’s strategy is given by σ(.,ti) : [ti,ti + τ′]  → {0,1}, where 0 means
refraining and 1 means attacking. The aggregate attacking pressure of all the traders







∗(t0) = inf{t|s(t,t0) ≥ k or t = t0 + τ
′} (3)
denote the collapse time of the ﬁxed exchange rate regime for a given realization of
t0. Recall that Φ(.|ti) denotes trader i’s belief about t0 given that t0 ∈ [ti − η,ti].
Hence, his belief about the collapse time is given by the CDF
Π(t|ti) = Prob(T
∗(t0) < t|ti)
So Π(t|ti) gives us trader ti’s belief on the probability with which the regime collapses
before time t.
The time ti expected payoﬀs of trader ti, who remains refraining until he begins





∗−1(s)) − c(s − t)]dΠ(s|ti) − c
F,
provided that the attacking pressure at t does not strictly exceed k and that T ∗(.) is
strictly increasing in t0. Later we will show that in equilibrium all the conditions will
hold.




∗−1(s)) − c(s − t)]dΠ(s|ti) − c
F. (4)
3.2 Equilibrium Characterization
We conﬁne our attention to symmetric trigger strategies. We can prove that there is a
unique symmetric trigger strategy equilibrium. In this equilibrium, each trader ti will
attack at the instant ti + τ∗ and keep attacking until the regime collapses. (Rochon
(2006) proves in a similar setup that this symmetric trigger strategy equilibrium is
a strongly rational expectation equilibrium in the set of strategies, with the only
restriction that traders act after being informed). Depending upon parameter values
of η, k, g and c, the regime can collapse exogenously or endogenously. Here we will
focus on the endogenous collapse case.
Proposition 1. Given τ′ > c
gkη and c ≥ g, there is a unique symmetric trigger
strategy equilibrium where the regime collapses endogenously. In this equilibrium,
each trader ti begins to attack at the instant ti + τ∗ and keeps attacking until the
regime collapses, where τ∗ =
c−g
g kη. In equilibrium the regime collapses exactly at the
instant t0 + kη + τ∗.
Given τ′ > kη and c < g, there is a unique symmetric trigger strategy equilibrium
where the regime collapses endogenously. In this equilibrium, each trader ti begins to
attack at the instant ti and keeps attacking until the regime collapses. In equilibrium
the regime collapses exactly at the instant t0 + kη.
Proof:
Let τ∗ deﬁne a symmetric trigger equilibrium. That is, all the traders begin to
17attack at ti + τ∗. Given such a strategy, the regime will collapse when trader t0 + kη
attacks, and the collapsing time will be t0 + kη + τ∗.
Now consider the optimal strategy of trader ti given that all the other traders take
the strategy τ∗. Thus the regime will collapse at t0 + ζ, where ζ = kη + τ∗. Trader
ti believes that t0 ∈ [ti − η,ti], the CDF of his posterior belief about t0 is given by
Φ(t|ti) =
t − ti + η
η
. (5)
Since the collapsing time is t0 +ζ, he believes that t0 +ζ ∈ [ti −η+ζ,ti+ζ]. The
CDF of his posterior belief about the collapsing date t0 +ζ at time ti +τ is given by
Π(ti + τ|ti) =
ti + τ − (ti − η + ζ)
η
=
τ + η − ζ
η
. (6)
Trader ti’s expected payoﬀ from attacking at t and keeping attacking until the




∗−1(s)) − c(s − t))dΠ(s|ti) − c
F. (7)
The ﬁrst order condition gives the optimal τ for him to attack:
π(ti + τ|ti)
1 − Π(ti + τ|ti)
=
c
g(ti + τ − T ∗−1(ti + τ))
. (8)
We also check the second order condition, which turns out that the second order
derivative is negative and the second order condition is satisﬁed.
Taking Equation (6) into the left hand side of the ﬁrst order condition gives us:
π(ti + τ|ti)





In addition, in this symmetric equilibrium, the duration between the time when
the regime collapses and the time when the overvaluation happens is given by: ti +
18τ − T ∗−1(ti + τ) = τ∗ + kη = ζ. This is because each trader will delay a period of
τ∗ and the regime will collapse exactly at the moment t0 + kη + τ∗ when the trader
t0 + kη launches his attack.
So we ﬁnd:
1












gkη < τ′, the regime will collapse at t0 + kη + τ∗ < t0 + τ′ endogenously.
Notice that τ∗ ≥ 0 if and only if c ≥ g. When c < g, we will get the corner
solution of τ∗ = 0.
Q.E.D
The intuition of the equilibrium is as follows. Given that all the traders begin
their attack at ti + τ∗, the instantaneous probability that the regime collapses at
ti + τ of trader ti is given by:
π(ti + τ|ti)
1 − Π(ti + τ|ti)
=
1
τ∗ + kη − τ
. (12)
If the regime exactly collapses at ti+τ, the gains from attacking will be g(τ∗+kη).








τ∗ + kη − τ
.
Meanwhile, the marginal costs incurred by attacking at time ti+τ are c, which are
constant. From the above equations we can see that the expected marginal gains from
attacking are strictly increasing in τ, since the trader ti’s subjective instantaneous
19probability that the regime collapses at time ti+τ is strictly increasing in τ. So there
is a unique level of τ, where the expected marginal gains from attacking are exactly
equal to the marginal costs incurred by attacking. And it is the optimal time for
trader ti to attack. Figures 2 and 3 explain the intuition.
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Figure 2: How the marginal costs and beneﬁts change in τ in the case of the interior solution of τ∗
3.3 Comparative Statics
This section studies how the changes in parameters of the model inﬂuence equilibrium
results.






First, we can see that the traders will wait longer with higher c. The intuition is
simple. Higher c means that it will cost more if a trader launches an attack early.































Figure 3: How the marginal costs and beneﬁts change in τ in the case of the corner solution of τ∗
Second, we ﬁnd that the traders will wait longer with both higher k and η. This
result is also intuitive. Higher η means more dispersed opinions among the traders
and higher k means a higher requirement for coordination. Both will increase the
diﬃculties in coordination and induce the traders to wait longer.
We know that c, k and η are all parameters indicating how diﬃcult it is to arbitrage
in a foreign exchange market. We ﬁnd that now the frictions in the market become
a blessing for the traders, since more frictions will induce the traders to wait longer
and make higher proﬁts from the overvaluation.
Third, we ﬁnd that the traders will wait longer with lower g, the rate at which
the currency is overvalued. In this case, higher g increases the traders’ incentive to
preempt other traders and makes the traders less patient. In the extreme case when
g > c, traders will launch an attack immediately after they become aware of the
overvaluation.
21Finally, there is an interesting result about the exchange rate level when the regime
collapses, which determines the magnitude of the devaluation. It is given by ckη. We
can see that g does not play a role in determining the magnitude of the devaluation.
This is because the speed at which the fundamental value of the currency decreases
has two opposite eﬀects: First, it aﬀects the optimal delay time of traders. Second, it
aﬀects the fundamental exchange rate at time t. The net result from these two eﬀects
is that g will not inﬂuence the exchange rate when the regime collapses.
4 The Model in which the Large Trader Has Per-
fect Information
In this section, we introduce a large trader into the basic model. We start with a
simple model in which the large trader has perfect information about t0, the time at
which the overvaluation happens. Later in Section 5, we will generalize the model
into the one in which the large trader has incomplete information about t0.
Moreover, we assume that traders consist of one large trader with wealth λ < k
and a continuum of small traders of mass 1 with total wealth of 1. Here we assume
λ < k such that the large trader cannot independently break the peg. This assumption
is realistic because even a large trader like Soros in ﬁnancial markets cannot single-
handedly break a currency peg. Last, we assume that the action of the large trader
will not be observed by other traders. We also assume cF for simplicity since it
does not aﬀect equilibrium outcomes. All the other assumptions for small traders are
unchanged.
224.1 Equilibrium Characterization
Proposition 2 characterizes the unique trigger strategy equilibrium in this game.
Proposition 2. Given c > g, λ > c
c+gk, and τ′ > c
c+gkη, there is a unique Bayesian
equilibrium where the regime collapses endogenously. In this equilibrium, each small
trader begins to attack at the instant ti + τST and keeps attacking until the regime
collapses. Here τST =
c−g
c+gkη. The large trader begins to attack at t0 + τLT, where
τLT = c
c+gkη. The regime collapses exactly at the time when the large trader launches
the attack.
Given c > g, λ ≤ c
c+gk, and τ′ > c
g(k−λ)η, there is a unique Bayesian equilibrium
where the regime collapses endogenously. In this equilibrium, each small trader begins
to attack at the instant ti + τST and keeps attacking until the regime collapses. Here
τST =
c−g
g (k−λ)η. The large trader begins to attack at t0+τLT, where τLT = c
g(k−λ)η.
The regime collapses exactly at the time when the large trader launches the attack.
Given c ≤ g, λ > 1
2k, and τ′ > 1
2kη, there is a unique Bayesian equilibrium
where the regime collapses endogenously. In this equilibrium, each small trader begins
to attack at the instant ti and keeps attacking until the regime collapses. The large
trader begins to attack at t0 +τLT, where τLT = 1
2kη. The regime collapses exactly at
the time when the large trader launches the attack.
Given c ≤ g, λ ≤ 1
2k, and τ′ > (k − λ)η, there is a unique Bayesian equilibrium
where the regime collapses endogenously. In this equilibrium, each small trader begins
to attack at the instant ti and keeps attacking until the regime collapses. The large
trader begins to attack at t0+τLT, where τLT = (k−λ)η. The regime collapses exactly
at the time when the large trader launches the attack.
23Proof:
Since the large trader has perfect information about t0, he will choose the optimal
time t0 +τLT to maximize his proﬁts, given the equilibrium strategies taken by small
traders. Since small traders are identical ex ante and atomically small, they will take
symmetric strategies. Suppose that each small trader plays the symmetric trading
strategy ti+τST in equilibrium. From the moment of t0+(k−λ)η+τST on, the total
wealth of the large trader and small traders exceeds the threshold level k. Thus, the
payoﬀs of the large trader from attacking at t0 + (k − λ)η + τST + t are given by
g[(k − λ)η + τ




where 0 ≤ t ≤ λη.
Notice that t ≤ λη, or the regime will collapse solely due to the attacking pressure
from small traders, and the large trader will gain zero proﬁts. The large trader will
choose an optimal level of t to maximize his expected proﬁts. Solving the maximiza-
tion problem, we get that t∗ = max{(λ − 1
2k)η − τST
2 ,0}.
Now let us look at the best responses of small traders. Our previous proof for the
unique symmetric trigger strategy equilibrium still holds in this case. Only now the
optimal attacking time ti + τST is determined by the following conditions.
Given (λ − 1
2k)η − τST
2 > 0, the optimal strategy of the large trader is t∗ = (λ −
1
2k)η− τST
2 . Thus, in equilibrium the regime collapses at T ∗ = t0+ζ = t0+ 1
2(kη+τST).
Therefore, the ﬁrst order condition gives
π(ti + τST|ti)
1 − Π(ti + τST|ti)
=
1




In equilibrium, ζ =
1
2(k + τST). Thus we get τST = max{
c−g
c+gkη,0}. Given




c+gkη. Checking the condition inducing the large trader to choose positive t∗,
(λ − 1
2k)η − τST





Therefore, we get the ﬁrst equilibrium in Proposition 2.
Similarly, we can ﬁnd the second, third and fourth equilibria depending on diﬀerent
parameter values of c, g, λ and k.
Q.E.D.
4.2 The Role of the Large Trader
In this section, we analyze the role that a large trader plays in a currency attack
based on our model. Our ﬁndings are the following:
1. In general, the presence of a large trader accelerates the collapse of the regime.
λ 





(c/c+g)k  k 
the case with a large player 
the case without a large player 
Figure 4: Collapsing time of the regime when c > g
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(1/2)k  k 
the case with a large player 
the case without a large player 
Figure 5: Collapsing time of the regime when c ≤ g
Figure 4 and 5 illustrate how the introduction of a large trader changes the
collapsing time of the regime. We can tell that in both cases of c > g and c ≤ g,
the introduction of a large trader accelerates the collapse of the regime.
2. The collapse of the regime is accelerated due to two reasons: ﬁrst, additional
wealth of λ is available from t0 for the attack with the introduction of a large
trader. Second, the presence of a large trader makes small traders more aggres-
sive and shorten their waiting time τST.
The ﬁrst reason is straightforward to understand. The second reason can be
explained by comparing τST in the case with and without the large trader.
Recall that in the case without a large trader, τST =
(c−g)kη
g when c > g, and












Thus we can see in the case c > g, small traders will shorten their waiting time
in equilibrium. In the case of c ≤ g, τST = 0 in both cases with and without
the presence of a large trader.
263. So far we have studied the role of a large trader by assuming that the presence
of a large trader will bring some extra wealth for attacking. Without a large
trader, the total potential attacking wealth is 1. With a large trader, the total
potential attacking wealth is 1 + λ with λ of which aware of the overvaluation
at t0, and 1 of which aware of the overvaluation over the time window t0 + η.
Now we are interested in studying what will happen if the presence of a large
trader does not change the total amount of potential attacking wealth. Instead,
we assume that the presence of a large trader only changes the distribution of
the attacking wealth. More speciﬁcally, we set up a benchmark case in which
the total attacking wealth of 1 + λ is evenly distributed over all small traders
who become aware of the overvaluation over [t0,t0 + η]. Then we compare this
benchmark case with our model with a large trader. We ﬁnd that the presence
of a large trader will accelerate the collapse of the regime compared to the
benchmark case.
In the benchmark case without a large trader, the regime will collapse at t0 +
k









we only consider the case of c > g). Recall that in the case with a large trader,
the regime collapses at t0 + c
c+gkη given λ > c
c+gk, and at t0 + c




Comparing these two cases, we ﬁnd that the presence of a large trader will
deﬁnitely accelerate the collapse of the regime (see Appendix A for a detailed
derivation). Later we will study the case when the large trader has incomplete
information about the time when the currency is overvalued. We ﬁnd that this
result may not hold in this case.
274. In general, the larger the wealth of a large trader is, the sooner the regime
collapses. That is, τLT is non-increasing in λ. Our model reveals an interesting
relationship between the wealth of a large trader and the collapsing time of
the regime. When λ is small enough, there is a strictly decreasing relationship
between these two variables. However, when λ is large enough, the collapsing
time will be invarient to changes in λ. This relationship is true in both cases
of c > g and c ≤ g. The only diﬀerence is that in the ﬁrst case of c > g, the
critical value for λ is c
c+gk. While in the case of c ≤ g, the critical value for λ
is 1
2k.
5. The presence of a large trader does not necessarily reduce the“bubble”, which
is deﬁned as the time interval between the moment when traders with total
wealth of k become aware of the overvaluation and the moment when the regime
actually collapses. Given the deﬁnition of the “bubble” in our model, in the
case without a large trader, the “bubble” is
c−g
g kη when c > g. It is 0 when
c ≤ g. In the case with a large trader,
(a) When c > g and λ > c
c+gk, the “bubble” is c
c+gkη − (k − λ)η < c
c+gkη.
(b) When c > g and λ ≤
c
c+gk, the “bubble” is
c−g
g (k − λ)η <
c−g
g kη .
(c) When c ≤ g and λ > 1
2k, the “bubble” is 1
2kη − (k − λ)η > 0.
(d) When c ≤ g and λ ≤ 1
2k, the “bubble” is 0.
Thus we ﬁnd that:
(a) In the case of c ≤ g, the presence of a large trader will lead to a positive
bubble when λ > 1
2k. While there is no bubble at all when c ≤ g without
28a large trader. In this case, the presence of a large trader increases the
“bubble”.
(b) In the case when c > g and λ >
c
c+gk, the bubble could be increased or
decreased, depending on parameter values of c, g and λ. In addition, the
bubble is strictly increasing in λ in this case.
(c) When c > g and λ ≤ c
c+gk, the presence of a large trader deﬁnitely increases
the “bubble”.
5 The Model in Which the Large Trader Has In-
complete Information
Now let us examine a more general case in which the large trader has incomplete
information about t0. We are interested in this case because in reality even large
traders cannot be absolutely certain about the precise moment at which the overval-
uation starts. Moreover, with the incomplete information assumption, we can study
how the degree of precision of the large trader’s information inﬂuences the equilib-
rium outcomes. Thus, we can gain more insights about the role of large traders in a
currency attack.
More speciﬁcally, we assume that ηLT is the time window for the large trader to
become aware of the currency overvaluation. That is, the probability that the large
trader becomes aware of the overvaluation is evenly distributed over [t0,t0 + ηLT].
We use tLT to denote the moment at which the large trader becomes aware of the
overvaluation.
29The major results that we ﬁnd in this section are:
1. With some reasonable parameter values, there is a unique trigger strategy per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium in the game. In this equilibrium, the large trader
will launch the attack some certain periods, τLT, after he becomes aware of the
overvaluation and will keep attacking afterward until the regime collapses. All
small traders will launch the attack some certain periods, τST, after he becomes
aware of the overvaluation and will keep attacking afterward until the regime
collapses.
2. The equilibrium strategies of both the large trader and small traders, τLT and
τST, are increasing in the wealth of the large trader, λ.
3. When the precision of the large trader’s information increases (ηLT decreases),
the equilibrium strategy of the large trader, τLT will be lower, and the equilib-
rium strategy of small traders, τST will be higher.
4. The presence of a large trader greatly increases the unpredictability of the time
when the regime collapses given t0, the time when the overvaluation starts.
5. The presence of the large trader may delay the collapse of the regime ex post,
especially when the large trader has very imprecise information and a large
amount of wealth.
5.1 Equilibrium Characterization
First, we deﬁne a trigger strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which small traders
take a symmetric trigger strategy ti+τST, and the large trader takes a trigger strategy
30tLT + τLT as follows:
1. For the large trader, given τST, τLT maximizes his expected proﬁts.
2. For a small trader, given τLT played by the large trader and τST played by all
the other small traders, τST maximizes his expected proﬁts.
3. Each trader updates his belief whenever Bayes’ rule is applied.
Now we need to specify the expected proﬁt functions for both the large trader
and small traders. For a large trader, his expected proﬁt of attacking at t given small








where Π(s|tLT) denotes the CDF of the large trader’s belief about t0+(k−λ)η+τST,
which is uniformly distributed over [tLT −ηLT +(k−λ)η+τST,tLT +(k−λ)η+τST].
In addition, we have
f(t,s) =

    
    
0, when t > s + λη
(λ − t−s
η )[(k − λ)η + τST + t − s]g, when s < t ≤ s + λη
λ{[(k − λ)η + τST]g − c(s − t)}, when t ≤ s
The reason why we have the above expression is as follows:
1. When t > s + λη, the regime already collapses when the large trader attacks,
and the large trader’s proﬁt is 0.
2. When s < t ≤ s + λη, the large trader attacks in the range of [t0 + (k − λ)η +
τST,t0+kη+τST], and the regime will collapse exactly at the moment when the
31large trader attacks. Thus the large trader’s proﬁt is given by: (λ − t−s
η )[(k −
λ)η + τST + t − s]g.
3. When t ≤ s, the large trader attacks before t0 +(k−λ)η+τST, and the regime
will collapse exactly at t0 + (k − λ)η + τST. Thus the large trader’s proﬁt is
given by: λ{[(k − λ)η + τST]g − c(s − t)}.
The large trader will choose the optimal attacking time t to maximize his proﬁts.
By solving the large trader’s proﬁt maximization problem, we will ﬁnd the large
trader’s best response of τLT as a function of τST.
Due to the property of the large trader’s proﬁt function, it is extremely diﬃcult to
ﬁnd the analytical solution for the large trader’s best response function. Numerical
solution will be given in Section 5.2.
For a small trader, his expected payoﬀ of attacking at t given the large trader’s
strategy of τLT and all the other small traders taking the strategy τST crucially
depends on diﬀerent combinations of τLT, τST, (k − λ)η, kη and ηLT. It turns out
that there are six diﬀerent combinations and the small trader’s expected proﬁt is as
follows under each combination:
1. When t0 + τLT ≥ t0 + kη + τST, the regime collapses at t0 + kη + τST.
(a) If t > ti+kη+τST, E(ΠST|ti) = 0 since the regime already collapses when
the small trader attacks.






ST] − c(s − t)}dΩ(s|ti).
32Here Ω(.) is the CDF of t0+kη+τST conditional on ti, which is uniformly
distributed over [ti − η + kη + τST,ti + kη + τST]. If t0 + kη + τST < t,
the regime already collapses when the small trader attacks, and the small
trader gains 0. If t0 + kη +τST ≥ t, the regime collapses at t0 +kη + τST,
and the small trader gains g(kη + τST) − c(t0 + kη + τST − t). Therefore,
we have the above expected payoﬀ function.
(c) If t < ti − η + kη + τST, E(ΠST|ti) =
  ti+kη+τST
ti−η+kη+τST{g(kη + τST) − c(s −
t)}dΩ(s|ti).
This case is similar to the above one except that the small trader’s attack-
ing time t is earlier than ti − η + kη + τST. Thus the small trader always
attacks before t0 + kη + τST. In this case, the lower bound of the above
integration is ti − η + kη + τST, instead of t.
2. When t0 + (k − λ)η + τST ≥ t0 + ηLT + τLT, the regime collapses at t0 + (k −
λ)η + τST, and the small trader’s proﬁt is:
(a) If t > ti+(k−λ)η+τST, E(ΠST|ti) = 0 since the regime already collapses
when the small trader attacks.





{g[(k − λ)η + τ
ST] − c(s − t)}dΨ(s|ti).
Here Ψ(.) is the CDF of t0 + (k − λ)η + τST conditional on ti, which is
uniformly distributed over [ti − η + (k − λ)η + τST,ti + (k − λ)η + τST].
If t0 + (k − λ)η + τST < t, the regime already collapses when the small
trader attacks, and the small trader gains 0. If t0 + (k − λ)η + τST ≥ t,
33the regime collapses at t0 + (k − λ)η + τST, and the small trader gains
g[(k−λ)η+τST]−c(t0+(k−λ)η+τST −t). Therefore, we have the above
expected payoﬀ function.
(c) If t < ti − η + (k − λ)η + τST, E(ΠST|ti) =
  ti+(k−λ)η+τST
ti−η+(k−λ)η+τST{g[(k − λ)η +
τST] − c(s − t)}Ψ(s|ti).
This case is similar to the above one except that the small trader’s attack-
ing time t is earlier than ti −η +(k −λ)η +τST. Thus the lower bound of
the above integration is ti − η + (k − λ)η + τST, instead of t.
3. When t0+τLT ≤ t0+(k−λ)η+τST ≤ t0+ηLT +τLT ≤ t0+kη+τST, the regime
may collapse at t0 + (k − λ)η + τST or at tLT + τLT, depending on when the







Here Ω(x|ti) is the small trader’s CDF of t0 conditional on ti, which is uniformly
distributed over [ti−η,ti]. f(t,s,x) gives the expected payoﬀ of the small trader,
given t0 by attacking at t. Here s represents tLT +τLT, the time when the large
trader attacks, and x represents t0.
(a) when t > x + ηLT + τLT, f(t,s,x) = 0 since the regime already collapses
when the small trader attacks.




[g(s − x) − c(s − t)]dΦ(s|x)
34Here Φ(s|x) is the small trader’s CDF of tLT +τLT conditional on t0, which
is uniformly distributed over [x+τLT,x+ηLT +τLT]. In this case, if tLT +
τLT < t, the small trader will gain zero since the regime already collapses
when the small trader attacks. If tLT + τLT ≥ t, the regime collapses at
tLT +τLT, and the small trader gains g(tLT +τLT −t0)−c(tLT +τLT −t).
Therefore, we get the above expected payoﬀ function.




{g[(k − λ)η + τ





[g(s − x) − c(s − t)]dΦ(s|x)
In this case, if tLT + τLT < t0 + (k − λ)η + τST, the regime collapses at
t0 + (k − λ)η + τST. The small trader will gain g[(k − λ)η + τST] − c(t0 +
(k−λ)η+τST −t). If tLT +τLT ≥ t0+(k−λ)η+τST, the regime collapses
at tLT +τLT, and the small trader gains g(tLT +τLT −t0)−c(tLT +τLT −t).
Therefore, we get the above expected payoﬀ function.




{g[(k − λ)η + τ





[g(s − x) − c(s − t)]dΦ(s|x)
This case is similar to the above case. The only diﬀerence is that now the
small trader’s attacking time t is earlier than t0 +τLT. Therefore, the ﬁrst
item of the above expected payoﬀ function has the lower bound of x+τLT.
4. When t0 + τLT ≤ t0 + (k − λ)η + τST < t0 + kη + τST ≤ t0 + ηLT + τLT, the
regime may collapse at t0+(k−λ)η+τST, tLT +τLT or t0+kη+τST, depending






Here Ω(x|ti) and f(t,s,x) are the same as the ones in the above case.
(a) If t > x + kη + τST, f(t,s,x) = 0 since the regime already collapses when
the small trader attacks.
(b) If x+(k −λ)η +τST < t < x+kη +τST, f(t,s,x) =
  x+kη+τST
t [g(s−x)−
c(s − t)]dΦ(s|x) +
  x+ηLT+τLT
x+kη+τST [g(kη + τST) − c(x + kη + τST − t)]dΦ(s|x).
Here Φ(s|x) is the small trader’s CDF of tLT + τLT conditional on t0,
which is uniformly distributed over [t0 + τLT,t0 + ηLT + τLT]. In this
case, if tLT + τLT < t, the small trader will gain zero since the regime
already collapses when the small trader attacks. If t ≤ tLT + τLT ≤
t0+kη+τST, the regime collapses at tLT +τLT, and the small trader gains
g(tLT + τLT − t0) − c(tLT + τLT − t). If tLT + τLT ≥ t0 + kη + τST, the
small trader gains g(kη + τST) − c(t0 + kη + τST − t). Therefore, we get
the above expected payoﬀ function.
(c) If x+τLT < t < x+(k−λ)η+τST, f(t,s,x) =
  x+(k−λ)η+τST
t g((k−λ)η+
τST) − c(x + (k − λ)η + τST − t)dΦ(s|x) +
  x+kη+τST
x+(k−λ)η+τST g(s − x) − c(s −
t)dΦ(s|x) +
  x+ηLT+τLT
x+kη+τST [g(kη + τST) − c(x + kη + τST − t)]dΦ(s|x)
This case is similar to the above one except that now the small trader’s
attacking time t is earlier than t0 + (k − λ)η + τST. Thus if tLT + τLT <
t0 +(k −λ)η + τST, the small trader gains g[(k −λ)η + τST]−c(t0 + (k −
λ)η + τST − t). The rest will be similar to the above case.








τST) − c(x + kη + τST − t)]dΦ(s|x).
This case is similar to the above one except that now the small trader’s
attacking time t is earlier than t0 +τLT. Thus the lower bound of the ﬁrst
item in the above function is x + τLT, instead of t.
5. When t0 + (k − λ)η + τST ≤ t0 + τLT < t0 + ηLT + τLT ≤ t0 + kη + τST, the
regime collapses exactly at tLT + ηLT when the large trader attacks. Thus, the






Here Ω(x|ti) and f(t,s,x) are the same as the ones in the above case.
(a) If t > x+ηLT +τLT, f(t,s,x) = 0, since the regime already collapses when
the small trader attacks.
(b) If x + τLT ≤ t ≤ x + ηLT + τLT, f(t,s,x) =
  x+ηLT +τLT
t [g(s − x) − c(s −
t)]dΦ(s|x).
Here Φ(s|x) is the CDF of tLT +τLT (s) conditional on t0 (x). In this case,
the regime collapses at tLT +τLT, and the small trader gains g[tLT +τLT −
t0] − c(tLT + τLT − t).
(c) If t < x + τLT, f(t,s,x) =
  x+ηLT +τLT
x+τLT [g(s − x) − c(s − t)]dΦ(s|x).
This case is similar to the above one except that now the small trader’s
attacking time t is earlier than t0+τLT. Thus the lower bound of the above
function is x + τLT, instead of t.
376. When t0 + (k − λ)η + τST ≤ t0 + τLT ≤ t0 + kη + τST ≤ t0 + ηLT + τLT, the
regime collapses at tLT + τLT or t0 + kη + τST, depending on how tLT + ηLT is






Here Ω(x|ti) and f(t,s,x) are the same as the ones in the above cases.
(a) If t > x + kη + τST, f(t,s,x) = 0 since the regime already collapses when
the small trader attacks.
(b) If x + τLT < t < x + kη + τST, f(t,s,x) =
  x+kη+τST
t [g(s − x) − c(s −
t)]dΦ(s|x) +
  x+ηLT +τLT
x+kη+τST [g(kη + τST) − c(x + kη + τST − t)]dΦ(s|x).
Φ(s|x) is the small trader’s CDF of tLT + τLT conditional on t0, which
is uniformly distributed over [t0 + τLT,t0 + ηLT + τLT]. In this case, if
tLT + τLT < t, the small trader will gain zero since the regime already
collapses when the small trader attacks. If t0 + kη + τST ≥ tLT +τLT ≥ t,
the regime collapses at tLT +τLT, and the small trader gains g(tLT +τLT −
t0)−c(tLT +τLT −t). If tLT +τLT ≥ t0 +kη +τST, the small trader gains
g(kη + τST) − c(t0 + kη + τST − t). Therefore, we get the above expected
proﬁt function.
(c) If t < x + τLT, f(t,s,x) =
  x+kη+τST
x+τLT [g(s − x) − c(s − t)]dΦ(s|x) +
  x+ηLT+τLT
x+kη+τST [g(kη + τST) − c(x + kη + τST − t)]dΦ(s|x).
This case is similar to the above one except that now the small trader’s
attacking time t is earlier than t0 +τLT. Thus the lower bound of the ﬁrst
item in the above function is x + τLT, instead of t.
38The small trader will choose his attacking time to maximize his expected proﬁts.
Since this is a symmetric strategy equilibrium, τ∗ = τST in equilibrium. Thus we ﬁnd
the best response of small traders as a function of τLT.
It is diﬃcult to ﬁnd analytical solutions to the best responses of small traders
in each case due to the properties of the expected proﬁt function of small traders.
Numerical analysis will be given in Section 5.2.
We have two equations: τLT as a function of τST, and τST as a function of τLT.
Solving these two equations, we ﬁnd the equilibrium strategies for both the large
and small traders. In the following numerical examples, we demonstrate that with
reasonable parameter values, there exists a unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this
game.
5.2 Numerical Results
In this section, we will give some numerical examples to study the equilibrium in
this model. We assume that k = 0.9, λ = 0.5, η = 50, ηLT = 25, g = 0.01, and
c = 0.015 as the benchmark. Then we will conduct comparative statics practice on λ
and ηLT to examine how the size of the large trader’ wealth and the precision of the
large trader’s information will aﬀect equilibrium outcomes. Here we do not intend to
calibrate the economy. Instead, we only attempt to demonstrate qualitatively how
λ and ηLT aﬀect the economy. Here we choose c > g since it is a key condition to
induce traders to “ride the overvaluation” and to delay their attack after becoming
aware of the overvaluation in our model due to the setup of the model.
395.2.1 An Example
We study the equilibrium using a numerical example with the parameter values spec-
iﬁed at the beginning of this section.
First, we study how the equilibrium strategy of the large trader, τLT, changes
with small traders’ strategies τST.











Figure 6: How the Large Player’s Best Response τLT Changes in τST
From Figure 6 we can tell that the large trader’s strategy, τLT is strictly increasing
in small trader’s strategy τST. In addition, there is a seemingly linear relationship
40between τLT and τST. Further analytical analysis reveals that the slope of the curve
is close to 1 but not constant, slightly varying in τST. More speciﬁcally, with the
parameter values in our numerical example, the optimal τLT that maximizes the
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where w = kη + c
gλη + τST − 2λη.
Second, we examine how the equilibrium strategy of small traders, τST, changes
with the large trader’s strategy τLT.
From Figure 7 we ﬁnd that:
1. When τLT is extremely small, case 2 is realized. In this case, the regime will
collapse at t0 + (k − λ)η + τST, and the small trader’s equilibrium strategy
τST =
c−g
g (k − λ)η = 10, which is irrelevant to τLT.
2. When τLT gradually increases from 0, case 3 is realized. In this case, the regime
may collapse at t0 + (k − λ)η + τST or at tLT + τLT, depending on when the
large trader becomes aware of the overvaluation. The small trader’s equilibrium
strategy τST increases in the large trader’s strategy τLT. This is because the
collapsing time of the regime now depends on tLT + τLT, and a larger τLT will
delay the collapse of the regime and subsequently induce small traders to delay
their attack.













Figure 7: How Small Players’ Best Response τST Changes in τLT
3. When τLT increases further, case 6 is realized. In this case, the regime collapses
at tLT +τLT or t0+kη+τST, depending on how tLT +ηLT is realized. Similarly,
τST will increase in τLT here.
4. When τLT is extremely large, case 1 is realized. In this case, the regime will
collapse at t0 + kη + τST, and the small trader’s equilibrium strategy τST =
c−g
g kη = 22.5, which is irrelevant to τLT.
The equilibrium in this example is given by the intersection of the best responses
42of the large trader and small traders in Figure 8. From Figure 8 we can see that there
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Figure 8: The Equilibrium in the Example
is a unique equilibrium in our example. In this equilibrium, the large trader will
attack some periods between 20 and 25 after he becomes aware of the overvaluation.
Small traders will attack between period 10 and 15 after they become aware of the
overvaluation. Depending on exactly when the large trader becomes aware of the
overvaluation, the regime collapses at t0 + (k − λ)η + τST or tLT + τLT.
Further calculation tells us that in this example, in equilibrium τST = 12.41 and
τLT = 22.91. That is, in equilibrium, each small trader will launch an attack 12.41
43periods after he becomes aware of the overvaluation. While the large trader will
launch the attack 22.91 periods after he becomes aware of the overvaluation. The
regime will collapse at tLT + τLT if tLT ∈ [t0 + 9.5,t0 + 25]. If tLT ∈ [t0,t0 + 9.5], the
regime collapses at t0 + (k − λ)η + τST, or t0 + 32.41. We know that ex ante tLT is
uniformly distributed over [t0,t0+25]. Therefore, with probability of 38%, the regime
will collapse at t0 + 32.41. With probability of 62%, the regime will collapse at any
moment between t0 + 32.41 and t0 + 47.91.
Recall that in a market without a large trader, the collapsing time of the regime is
perfectly predictable given t0 is known. However, in the presence of the large trader,
we ﬁnd that the collapsing time of the regime becomes quite uncertain, and crucially
depends on when the large trader becomes aware of the overvaluation. Now given t0,
we only know the distribution of the time the regime collapses. Therefore, it becomes
much more diﬃcult for traders to time the collapse of the regime. In this sense, our
model demonstrates that the feature of predictability of the time of collapse given
t0 in a model only with small traders is quite fragile. It is rather sensitive to the
information structure in the model. Thus our model reveals that in a real world
with a much more complicated information structure than in our model, it will be
extremely diﬃcult for traders to time and proﬁt from a bubble.
5.2.2 How the Equilibrium Changes in λ
Now we examine how the size of the wealth of the large trader, λ, will inﬂuence the
dynamics of a currency attack. We ﬁnd that with larger size of the large trader’s
wealth, both the best response of the large trader τLT and that of small traders τST
will be smaller. A larger λ will accelerate the collapse of the regime greatly.
44Figure 9 shows that the large trader’s strategy, τLT, is strictly decreasing in his
size of wealth, λ. The intuition for this result is that the large trader will choose some
moment after t0 + (k − λ)η + τST to attack. With larger λ, t0 + (k − λ)η + τST is
lower, and the attacking moment of the large trader tends to be lower too.
















Figure 9: How the Large Player’s Best Response τLT Changes in λ
Figure 10 shows how small traders’ equilibrium strategy τST changes with λ. We
ﬁnd that the larger λ, the more often that τST falls into the range in which it is
increasing in τLT. That is, τST is more sensitive to the changes in τLT. In addition,
we ﬁnd that with larger λ, τST will be lower. That is, small traders will be more
45aggressive and attack sooner.



















Figure 10: How Small Players’ Best Response τST Changes in λ
The intuition for Figure 10 is as follows. Recall that with diﬀerent parameter
values, there are six diﬀerent combinations and each will give a diﬀerent expected
proﬁt function of the small trader. Consequently the small trader will have diﬀerent
best response under each combination. We ﬁnd that:
1. When λ is extremely large (λ = 0.7), with τLT increasing from 0, τLT < (k −
λ)η+τST < ηLT+τLT < kη+τST, (k−λ)η+τST < τLT < ηLT+τLT < kη+τST,
46(k−λ)η+τST < τLT < kη+τST < ηLT +τLT, and τLT > kη+τST are realized
sequentially.
2. When λ = 0.5 or 0.3, with τLT increasing from 0, τLT + ηLT < (k − λ)η + τST,
τLT < (k − λ)η + τST < ηLT + τLT < kη + τST, (k − λ)η + τST < τLT <
kη + τST < ηLT + τLT, and τLT > kη + τST are realized sequentially.
3. When λ is extremely small (λ = 0.1), with τLT increasing from 0, τLT + ηLT <
(k−λ)η+τST, τLT < (k−λ)η+τST < ηLT +τLT < kη+τST, τLT < (k−λ)η+
τST < kη + τST < ηLT + τLT, (k − λ)η + τST < τLT < kη + τST < ηLT + τLT,
and τLT > kη + τST are realized sequentially.
We ﬁnd that when λ equals 0.1, 0.3 and 0.5, the case of τLT +ηLT < (k−λ)η+τST
is realized when τLT starts from 0. We know that in this case, the regime collapses
at (k − λ)η + τST, which is irrelevant to the large trader’s strategy. That is why we
observe the ﬂat line in all the three cases. In addition, from last section, we know
that τST∗ =
c−g
g (k −λ)η. In our numerical examples, τST∗ will be 20 (when λ = 0.1),
15(when λ = 0.3), and 10(when λ = 0.5). This analytical result is consistent with
our numerical one.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that in all the above four examples, the case of τLT > kη+τST
will be realized when τLT is large enough. In this case, the regime collapses at kη+τST,
which is irrelevant to both τLT and λ. That is why we observe the overlapping ﬂat
lines in all the four example. Analytically we know that τST∗ =
c−g
g kη, which will be
22.5 in our numerical examples. This analytical result is consistent with our numerical
one.
Figure 11 shows how the equilibrium shifts when λ changes. We ﬁnd that with
47higher λ, both τST and τLT are smaller in equilibrium. That is, with larger size
of the wealth of the large trader, both the large trader and small traders are more
aggressive and attack sooner. The intuition is straightforward. With larger λ, both
best responses of the large trader and small traders will be more aggressive, leading
to more aggressive equilibrium outcomes. In addition, we ﬁnd that a larger λ greatly
accelerates the collapse of the regime. In our four examples, when λ equals 0.7, 0.5
and 0.3, the regime may collapses at t0 + (k − λ)η + τST or later, depending when
tLT is realized. The earliest collapsing time of the regime is reduced when λ is larger
not only because τST is smaller, but also because (k − λ)η is smaller.
5.2.3 How the Equilibrium Changes in ηLT
Here we examine how the precision of the large trader’s information will aﬀect the
dynamics of a currency attack. We ﬁnd that with more precise information of the
large trader leads to smaller τLT and larger τST.
Figure 12 shows that the large trader’s strategy, τLT is strictly decreasing in ηLT.
Thus, the more precise the large trader’s information is, the longer the large trader
will delay his attack after he becomes aware of the overvaluation. The intuition here
is that the more precise the large trader’s information is, the better he can time the
collapse of the regime, and the longer he can delay his attack.
Figure 13 shows how small traders’ equilibrium strategy τST changes with ηLT,
the precision of the large trader’s information.
From Figure 13, we can see that the larger ηLT is, the more often that τST falls
into the range that it is increasing in τLT. That is, τST is more sensitive to the
changes in τLT. Moveover, we ﬁnd that with lower ηLT, τST will be lower. That is,


















Figure 11: How the Equilibrium Changes in λ
small traders will be more aggressive and attack sooner. The intuition behind Figure
13 is as follows:
1. When τLT is extremely small, τLT + ηLT < (k − λ)η + τST, and the regime
collapses at t0 + (k − λ)η + τST. The smaller ηLT is, the more this case is
possible. This explains that the curve of ηLT = 5 has the longest ﬂat line
part when τLT increases from zero. Moreover, when the regime collapses at
t0 + (k − λ)η + τST, τST∗ =
c−g
g (k − λ)η = 10, which is irrelevant to ηLT. This



















Figure 12: How the Large Player’s Best Response τLT Changes in ηLT
explains the overlapping ﬂat part of all curves when τLT increases from zero.
2. With the increase in τLT, τLT < (k − λ)η + τST < τLT + ηLT < kη + τST. In
this case, the regime may collapses at t0 + (k − λ)η + τST or tLT + τLT, where
tLT ∈ [t0,t0 +ηLT]. With lower ηLT, the possible collapsing time tLT +τLT will
be smaller too. This explains why τST is lower with lower ηLT in this case.
3. When τLT keeps increasing, (k − λ)η + τST < τLT < τLT + ηLT < kη + τST.
In this case, the regime collapses at tLT + τLT for sure. τST is lower with lower



















Figure 13: How Small Players’ Best Response τST Changes in ηLT
ηLT for the similar reason we mentioned above.
4. When τLT keeps increasing, (k −λ)η + τST < τLT < kη + τST < τLT + ηLT. In
this case, the regime may collapse at tLT + τLT or t0 + kη + τST. τST is lower
with lower ηLT for the similar reason we mentioned above.
5. When τLT is extremely large, τLT > kη+τST. In this case, the regime collapses
at t0 + kη + τST, and τST∗ =
c−g
g kη = 22.5, which is irrelevant to ηLT. This
explains why all the curves converge to the same ﬂat line when τLT is large
51enough.
Figure 14 shows how the equilibrium changes in ηLT. From Figure 14 we can see
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Figure 14: How the Equilibrium Changes in ηLT
that with higher ηLT, the equilibrium strategy of the large trader, τLT, is smaller,
and the equilibrium strategy of small traders, τST, is larger. The intuition for this
result is straightforward. With large ηLT, the best response of the large trader given
the same τST, τLT, is lower, and the best response of small traders given the same
τLT, τST, is higher. The co-movement of these two changes leads to the equilibrium
52change. Note that in Section 4, we study the case when the large trader has perfect
information about t0. That is, ηLT = 0. Given the parameter values in our numerical
example, c = 0.015 > g = 0.01 and λ = 0.5 < c
c+gk = 0.54. Thus in the equilibrium,
τLT = c
g(k − λ)η = 30, and τST =
c−g
g (k − λ)η = 10. Figure 14 reveals when ηLT
decreases from 25 to 1, the equilibrium does converge to τST = 10 and τLT = 30.
We ﬁnd that the uncertainty (about the time when the regime collapses) greatly
increases when the precision of the large trader’s information decreases. In the ex-
treme case where the large trader has perfect information, the time when the regime
collapses is perfectly predictable given t0 is known. However, when the large trader
has incomplete information about the time when the overvaluation starts, the time
when the regime collapses depends crucially on the time when the large trader be-
comes aware of the overvaluation (how tLT is realized), and we only have a distri-
bution about when the regime will collapse, even given t0 is known. In particular,
when the large trader has extremely imprecise information (ηLT is very large) and
a large amount of wealth (λ is very large), the presence of a large trader may delay
the collapse of the regime ex post, given that the realization of tLT is large. Here we
give a numerical example to illustrate this result. We assume that the large trader
has the same degree of precision of information as small traders. That is, ηLT = 50.
Meanwhile, we keep all the other parameters unchanged. That is, c = 0.015, g = 0.01,
k = 0.9, λ = 0.5, and η = 50.
Figure 15 shows how the equilibrium changes in ηLT. From the ﬁgure we can see
that in equilibrium τLT is around 11 and τST is around 14. So the regime may collapse
at any point between t0 +(k −λ)η+τST = t0 +34 and t0 +kη+τST = t0 +59. More
speciﬁcally, with the probability of 46% the regime will collapse at t0+(k−λ)η+τST.
53With the probability of 4% the regime will collapse at t0+kη+τST. With probability
of 50% the regime may collapse at any point between t0 + (k − λ)η + τST = t0 + 34
and t0 + kη + τST = t0 + 59. Now let us examine the case without a large trader.
Assume that the total wealth of both the large and small traders of 1 + λ is now
evenly distributed among all the small traders. Then the regime should collapse at
t0 + k




1+λη = 15. Therefore, the regime will collapse at
t0+45 for sure. Comparing this result with the case with a large trader, we ﬁnd that
1. With the presence of a large trader, the time when the regime collapses become
much more uncertain.
2. Ex post the regime may collapse later in the presence of a large trader. In our
example, the regime may collapse between t0+45 and t0+59 with a probability
of 32% (when tLT ∈ [t0 + 34,t0 + 50]). That is, with the probability of 32%,
the presence of the large trader will delay the collapse of the regime, instead of
accelerating the collapse of the regime.
6 Conclusions and Future Research
In this paper we study the role of a large trader in a currency attack using a dynamic
currency attack game where traders have to determine when to attack, based on
their incentives both to “ride the overvaluation” and to preempt other traders. One
of the major results we ﬁnd is that although the presence of a large trader will
always accelerate the collapse of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime when he has perfect
information, it may delay the collapse of a ﬁxed exchange rate regime when he has
















Figure 15: The Equilibrium When ηLT = 50
incomplete information. Moreover, we ﬁnd that a large trader with a large amount
of wealth and very noisy information (but less noisy than that of small traders) can
greatly delay the collapse of the regime. Finally, we ﬁnd that the introduction of
a large trader with incomplete information will increase the uncertainty about the
time when the regime collapses, compared to the case with only small traders, which
demonstrates the diﬃculty for traders to time the collapse of the regime in reality.
Although our paper is a study on currency attacks, its results can be generalized
to all asset markets. Therefore, our paper provides some insight about how a large
55trader will aﬀect the evolvement of asset bubbles and crashes in general. Our paper
demonstrates that the introduction of a large trader to a model with a continuum of
small traders can greatly aﬀect the evolution of asset bubbles and crashes. In this
sense, our paper reveals that market crashes are very sensitive to the information
structure and distribution among agents. Our current results can be interpreted as
those attained given that all large traders can collude and act as a single proﬁt-
maximizing large trader. In our future research, we plan to generalize our model by
introducing multiple large traders who cannot collude and study how the interaction
between large traders will aﬀect equilibrium outcomes.
56Appendices
A







1+λη. Thus, the regime collapses at t0 + c
g
k
1+λη (here we only consider
the case of c > g). Recall that in the case with a large trader, the regime collapses
at t0 +
c
c+gkη given λ >
c
c+gk, and at t0 +
c
g(k − λ)η given λ ≤
c
c+gk.
In the case of λ > c
c+gk, we ﬁnd that the presence of a large trader will delay the






1+λη. Simple algebra shows that it
holds if and only if λ > c
g > 1. Since λ < k < 1 by deﬁnition, it is not possible. In the
case of λ ≤ c
c+gk, we ﬁnd that the presence of a large trader will delay the collapse
of the regime if and only if
c




1+λη. Simple algebra shows that it holds if
and only if k > 1. Since k < 1 by deﬁnition, it is not possible.
B The Derivation for the First Order Derivative of
E(ΠLT|tLT) Given the Parameter Values in Our
Numerical Example
Given the parameter values in our numerical example, tLT −ηLT + (k − λ)η + τST <
t < tLT + (k − λ)η + τST. Or −ηLT + (k − λ)η + τST = −5 + τST < τLT < 20 + τST.
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The ﬁrst order derivative of the above expression w.r.t t gives us:
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The ﬁrst order derivative of the above expression w.r.t t gives us:
λ{c(¯ t − t) − g[(k − λ)η + τ
ST]}
58In sum, the ﬁrst order derivative of the large trader’s expected payoﬀ w.r.t t is
given by:
g[a + b(t − t) −
(t − t)2
η
] + λ{c(¯ t − t) − g[(k − λ)η + τ
ST]}
With some constraint on the parameter values, we will ﬁnd the optimal t that
maximizes the large trader’s expected payoﬀ.
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